MOGADISHU (Somaliguardian) – Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s diplomatic circuit through Ethiopia and Djibouti, followed by a planned visit to Egypt, is unfolding against a volatile backdrop in which Somalia’s domestic political disputes are increasingly entangled with the strategic calculations of its neighbours.
Mohamud met Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa on Tuesday for talks on bilateral relations and the political and security situation in the region. A day later, he met Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh in Djibouti City, where discussions centred on bilateral ties, regional security and cooperation.
He is expected to travel to Egypt next, with sources indicating that his programme will include meetings in New Alamein and discussions on Somalia-Egypt relations, security in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
The sequence is significant because each stop brings Somalia’s president into contact with a government that occupies a different position in the region’s increasingly intricate security architecture.
Ethiopia has deep military and political interests in Somalia, particularly in the country’s south-west.
Djibouti is a longstanding Somali political and security partner and an important diplomatic hub for the Horn of Africa.
Egypt has rapidly expanded its strategic relationship with Mogadishu, including military cooperation and participation in the African Union’s new security mission in Somalia.
At the centre of Somalia’s domestic calculations is Baidoa, where a political confrontation between Mogadishu and former South-West State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen has developed into a recurring armed conflict.
The question now confronting Mohamud is whether his regional diplomacy can secure political and security support for the federal government without allowing Somalia’s internal divisions to become entangled with the rivalries of larger regional powers.
From Addis Ababa to Djibouti
Mohamud’s visit to Ethiopia was officially described as a one-day working visit.
According to Somalia’s state news agency, the president met Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa and discussed strengthening Somalia-Ethiopia relations, as well as political and security developments across the region.
The two leaders also emphasised regional cooperation to support peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.
The meeting came at a sensitive moment in bilateral relations.
Ethiopia remains one of Somalia’s most consequential security partners, but the relationship has also passed through periods of severe tension, particularly after Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland in January 2024.
That dispute eventually produced the Ankara Declaration, a Turkish-mediated agreement under which Somalia and Ethiopia committed to resolving their differences through dialogue and pursuing arrangements for Ethiopia’s access to the sea under Somali sovereignty.
The latest A]ddis Ababa meeting suggests that, despite unresolved strategic differences, Mogadishu and Addis Ababa continue to regard direct presidential dialogue as necessary.
The timing also matters because Ethiopia’s own security environment has deteriorated again, with renewed fighting in the north adding another layer of uncertainty to a country whose military and political influence extends deeply into Somalia.
From Addis Ababa, Mohamud travelled to Djibouti.
President Ismail Omar Guelleh received him on Wednesday for talks covering bilateral political, economic and security relations and wider developments in the Horn.
Djibouti has historically maintained close relations with Mogadishu and has played a recurring role in Somali diplomacy.
Its importance goes beyond its bilateral relationship with Somalia.
Djibouti sits at the Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints, and hosts the headquarters of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD.
Its geographical position also makes it an important participant in conversations about Red Sea security, Gulf of Aden shipping and the wider competition for influence across the Horn.
For Mohamud, therefore, the Djibouti stop provides another diplomatic channel at a time when Somalia is attempting to manage both an internal political crisis and a rapidly shifting regional security environment.
The Baidoa question follows Mohamud abroad
Behind the formal language of regional cooperation lies a much more immediate domestic problem: Baidoa.
The political crisis between Mogadishu and Laftagareen has become one of Somalia’s most consequential disputes between the federal government and a federal member state.
Laftagareen had led South-West State since 2018 and became increasingly opposed to Mogadishu’s constitutional and electoral agenda.
The dispute intensified in March after Laftagareen’s camp maintained that he had secured another term in office, while the Federal Government rejected the process.
On March 30, federal forces seized Baidoa.
Laftagareen subsequently resigned, but the resignation did not resolve the political dispute.
Instead, the struggle shifted from the question of who controlled the regional presidency to a broader contest over political legitimacy, constitutional authority and the relationship between Mogadishu and South-West State.
In June, Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur Madobe, the former speaker of Somalia’s parliament, was elected president of South-West State.
Madobe’s election was backed by the Federal Government, and he was inaugurated in Baidoa in July in the presence of Mohamud and other senior federal officials.
Laftagareen’s camp rejected the transition.
The dispute subsequently returned to the battlefield.
On August 17, fighting erupted in Baidoa between federal forces and armed opponents aligned with Laftagareen. Reuters reported that federal troops regained control after intense fighting, while the Associated Press reported that dozens were killed or wounded in the broader violence, including civilians.
The competing sides have offered sharply different accounts of the fighting.
The Federal Government has alleged that Laftagareen-aligned forces cooperated with Al-Shabaab.
Laftagareen’s camp has rejected that accusation and described its forces as South-West State security personnel defending the region against federal intervention.
The allegations of cooperation with Al-Shabaab have not been independently established.
The distinction is critical because it places the Baidoa confrontation at the intersection of two very different issues: Somalia’s internal political struggle and the international campaign against Al-Shabaab.
For years, Ethiopian forces and Ethiopian-backed security arrangements have influenced the security environment in southern Somalia. Baidoa itself has historically been deeply connected to Ethiopia’s regional security calculations.
That history gives Addis Ababa influence that few other external actors possess.
It also makes Ethiopian involvement politically sensitive.
If Ethiopia supports Somalia against Al-Shabaab, its involvement can be presented as part of a broader counterterrorism partnership.
If Ethiopia is perceived to be taking sides in the federal government’s political confrontation with a regional administration, however, its role becomes considerably more contentious.
That is the narrow line Mohamud’s diplomacy must navigate.
Why Egypt matters now
Mohamud’s next stop is expected to be Egypt.
Somalia Today reported that the president was expected to travel to Cairo after Djibouti, with sources indicating that the Egyptian leg could take place on Friday. The report said discussions were expected to address bilateral relations, regional security and political developments across the Horn of Africa and Red Sea.
Mohamud is also expected to participate in high-level African meetings in New Alamein.
The participation of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has been reported as possible, but their attendance has not been publicly confirmed.
That means the current trip should not be described as a confirmed three-way presidential summit between Somalia, Egypt and Eritrea.
The three countries do, however, have an established diplomatic framework.
In October 2024, Mohamud, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki met in Asmara for a tripartite summit.
Their discussions covered regional stability, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states in the Horn, Red Sea security and support for Somalia’s national security institutions.
The three leaders also endorsed stronger coordination on Somalia’s security and expressed support for the Somali National Army.
That earlier summit remains an important reference point for understanding the strategic environment surrounding Mohamud’s current Egypt visit.
What could be discussed in Egypt?
The precise agenda for the forthcoming Egyptian meetings has not been publicly released in full.
But recent Somalia-Egypt presidential meetings provide a clear indication of the subjects that have dominated the bilateral relationship.
When Mohamud met el-Sisi in Cairo in February 2026, the two presidents discussed Somalia’s unity, security and territorial integrity, military and security cooperation, counterterrorism, regional conflicts and maritime security.
They also discussed Egypt’s participation in AUSSOM.
Egyptian President el-Sisi said Cairo was prepared to contribute forces to the mission and emphasised the importance of cooperation with Somalia in confronting terrorism and strengthening national institutions.
The two presidents also discussed the security of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, describing the stability of those waterways as a shared regional concern.
Those issues are likely to remain relevant during Mohamud’s forthcoming visit.
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